-This chapter offers an overview of institutional options for water rights. It introduces reasons why water rights are important and are receiving increasing attention, and then presents general principles related to property rights. Various institutional arrangements may regulate socially accepted claims to water, including self-governance, agency administration, and water markets. Methods for improving water rights and water allocation institutions include forming forums, clarifying water rights, developing techniques for planning and modeling, and building capacity of specialized management agencies. Institutional options for improving water rights can be combined into a framework that draws optimally on the strengths of various water allocation institutions.
The institutional frameworks that structure socially accepted access and entitlements to water take many forms. Sometimes they are easily seen in local agreements, customs, and physical structures. They may be informal, implicit, and embedded in local practices. Legislation and formal permits may explicitly codify rights. Water quantities are defined in many ways: by proportional shares, taking turns, periods of time, measured volumes, or combinations of these principles. Rights may be held by individuals or by organizations. They may last for a limited time or endure in perpetuity, and may vary according to season and water availability. Rights may apply only to a specific use and parcel of land, or may be flexible in use and transferable. Water quality may be specified, or left unstated. Rights inherently bring duties and responsibilities.
This chapter offers an overview of institutional options for water rights, taking a broad perspective that in trying to improve water resources management it is important to understand the many ways in which access to water is currently controlled and influenced by social institutions, and the multiple means available for improving water allocation. Thus, we go beyond the conventional analysis of water rights as deriving only from government law books and regulatory agencies to include a range of other types of water rights that exist in practice.
The chapter is particularly concerned with the "rules of the game" that structure access to water when competition over water expands beyond small face-toface communities. In these cases, interaction occurs between strangers who may have few other common concerns beyond sharing an increasingly contested resource. The institutions involved include not just formal water rights supported by laws and licenses, but a range of different negotiation arenas through which different stakeholders in water management may seek to increase, defend, or otherwise influence their access to water, for example, by building infrastructure, adjusting gates and other water facilities, negotiating disputes, appealing to bureaucratic agencies, suing in court, or lobbying for legislation.
The second section of this chapter presents some of the reasons why water rights are important and are receiving increasing attention as a means for alleviating poverty, promoting economic growth, and protecting habitats and environmental services. Next, the third section looks at general principles of property rights, after which the fourth section examines three major types of water allocation institutions: agency allocation, user management, and water markets, and how these may be combined and transformed. The fifth section reviews some of the means available for improving water allocation institutions, including ways of clarifying water rights, strengthening forums for interaction among stakeholders, forming specialized agencies, and applying planning and modeling methodologies. The con-from land rights. Property rights can be defined as "the claims, entitlements, and related obligations among people regarding the use and disposition of a scarce resource" (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972) . As long as the resource is plentiful, there is little pressure to define or enforce rights. As the resource becomes scarcer, however, there is greater competition for it, and property rights can clarify expectations and thereby reduce conflict over the resource. Bromley (1992:4) points out that "Rights have no meaning without correlated duties . . . on aspiring users to refrain from use." Property rights are not a relationship between a person and a thing, but are social relationships between people with regard to some object (the property). Property rights are effective (legitimized) only if there are some kind of institutions to stand behind them, and the rights are only as strong as those institutions.
In many cases, the state is a primary institution supporting property rights, but this is not necessarily the case. Customary rights may be backed by local authority and social norms. In the case of land rights in Africa, many customary land tenure arrangements have provided as much tenure security as governmentissued title to the resource (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994). The same often applies to water rights (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick 2000) . Security of property rights-the assurance that one will receive benefits in the future-matters because it affects incentives to invest in and conserve the underlying resource.
Although many people equate property rights with "ownership" of a resource and the ability to do whatever one wants with it, it is more useful to think of bundles of rights that different parties may hold. These bundles of rights can be broadly defined as use rights of access and withdrawal, and control or decisionmaking rights to manage the resource, exclude others from it, and to alienate, or transfer, rights to the resource to others (see the chapter by Schlager in this volume, and see Schlager and Ostrom 1992; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz 1996) . Different people, groups, or agencies may hold different and overlapping bundles of rights over the same resource. For example, in the case of water, all women of the community may have rights to draw water from a stream for cooking and washing purposes. Animal owners may have the right to water their herds or flocks at certain places. Farmers who invested in building an irrigation system may have rights to divert water for their crops (all of which are use rights). At the same time, the village community, irrigators' association, or the state may claim rights to decide on the timing of water use, changes to the river, and granting of permission to new users (management or control rights). These overlapping uses and users of water complicate analyses and mean that simplistic models of water rights derived from pure state or private land ownership are unlikely to be appropriate.
Institutional Alternatives for Water Allocation
Property rights regimes can be broadly classified as public, private, and common property, based on who holds rights. In public property, the state holds rights; in private property, individuals (or legal individuals, such as corporations) hold rights; and in common property, rights are held by a group of people. Similarly, institutional arrangements for water allocation, and particularly for reallocation, can be grouped in three broad types (Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza 1996; Meinzen-Dick and Rosegrant 1997):
• In user-based allocation, water users join together to coordinate their actions, managing water resources as a form of common property.
• In agency allocation, water is treated as public property, with government agencies assuming authority for directing who does and does not receive water in accordance with bureaucratic policies and procedures.
• In market allocation, which corresponds with private property held by individuals or organizations, water may be allocated and reallocated through private transactions, with users trading water through short-or long-term agreements, reallocating rights in response to prices.
These three forms of water allocation institutions may be combined in various ways at different locations and levels of water management. For example, within the same river basin or even within an irrigation system, there may be common property management within and between some groups of users, transfers between individual farmers occurring through market-type mechanisms, and agencies administering allocation of water resources. User management and private exchanges may be based solely on local institutions, or take place in the context of licenses and other government regulations. A theme of this chapter is that improving water management will often be a matter of finding an optimal combination of all three forms of allocation institutions, employing multiple frameworks that draw on the different advantages of self-governance among users, bureaucratic agencies, and market mechanisms.
User-Based Allocation
In many places throughout the world, water rights derive from membership in local organizations that manage irrigation or water supply systems. Access to water often depends on contributions to the original investment and on fulfilling continuing obligations for operation and maintenance. Allocation of water may be assigned according to shares of the available flow, periods of time, quantities, turns, and other rules (Maass and Anderson 1978) . Such rules become embodied and further modified in the physical shape of division structures and outlets, and in procedures for distributing water during periods of scarcity. A common source of problems occurs when outside intervention, intended to improve local systems, is carried out without due attention to the existing local rights and obligations. Externally imposed criteria, such as allocation strictly in proportion to land area, may not only increase inequity, but also disrupt local rights and practices with their flexible adaptations to the complexity of local history and conditions, such as detailed adjustments made locally to account for such factors as earlier investments in building the system; variations in soils, slopes, and drainage; and tolerance for minor or temporary violations of local rules (e.g., see Vermillion 2000) . External intervention may also ignore or disrupt local sources of knowledge and legitimacy. At the local level, the effectiveness of institutions may derive from longstanding relationships between friends and neighbors; informal or formal organizations; and local values regarding equity, leadership, sanctions, and other matters. These relationships constitute a form of social capital, which provides an essential framework for water rights and allocation at the local level.
In many aspects of natural resources management, including water, the value of local institutions, such as irrigators' organizations, is now more widely appreciated. Rather than ignoring or replacing local organizations, attempts are being made to integrate them into government arrangements, for example, through the establishment of formal water user organizations, transfer of management responsibilities for irrigation or water supply to community-based groups, and increasing stakeholder participation in the planning and management of large water projects and river basins.
As competition over water grows, local organizations face competition from other users, particularly those taking water upstream and downstream users who want to limit upstream abstractions. Typically, such conflicts extend beyond the bounds of face-to-face communities. As mentioned previously, solving such problems requires dealing with strangers who often have few links beyond using the same resource. As in other aspects of social and economic life, governments can play a crucial role in creating institutions, including laws, courts, regulatory bodies, and other public services, which help disputants to resolve their differences peacefully and forge enforceable agreements. Important choices are involved in what role government chooses to play concerning such disputes, whether facilitating negotiations among users, asserting direct control through a government bureaucracy, or establishing conditions that enable users to transfer water among themselves, or some combination of these.
Agency Administration
National constitutions, laws, and regulations usually declare that water is owned by the nation, with the government authorized to control water resources in the national interest. This has typically been interpreted as a mandate authorizing bureaucratic agencies to control water directly (rather than indirect control through establishing and regulating institutional frameworks for self-governance and voluntary exchange). Allocation decisions were often framed primarily in technical terms of engineering procedures such as irrigation schedules and reservoir operation rules. User participation beyond the lowest level of the system was often absent, or officially restricted to submitting requests. Subsequent decisions were typically at the discretion of agency officials, with relatively little communication and accountability to users. Professional norms and bureaucratic procedures thus became a primary basis for water allocation in agency-controlled systems, often with little or no formal specification of water rights of the ultimate users. Moreover, during the twentieth century, governments dramatically expanded their roles in many spheres, including water management. Government agencies built large dams, reservoirs, irrigation networks, and urban water supply systems, and usually continued to operate the projects they had built. The rules and procedures of such agency projects ("project law") thus played a major role in determining who received water. Agencies building and managing reservoirs, irrigation systems, and other projects typically did not just directly deliver water, but also carried out a range of regulatory roles, allocating rights, resolving disputes, and reallocating water. A number of countries have adopted devolution policies or "irrigation management transfer" (IMT) since the 1990s, and this has provided the impetus for reforms to water laws in some cases. But in practice, many countries have not turned over their water allocation function to user groups, or even provided users with significant formal water rights (Vermillion 2001) , leaving allocation relatively unclear, uncertain, and unaccountable.
Market Allocation
The holder of a water right, whether an individual, association, municipality, or other entity, may be able to transfer their rights over water to others. In other words, one part of the "bundle" of rights would be alienation rights. A water right might be transferred temporarily as in a lease, or permanently. It might be tied to land or transferable separately. Although individuals often hold use rights to water even under agency-or user-based allocation systems, larger institutions, such as water users' associations or government agencies, may hold decisionmaking rights concerning reallocation or transfer. Rights-holders may be able to arrange transfers among themselves, or the transfers may need to be reviewed and authorized by another body, whether a local irrigators' organization or a government agency.
Short-term water transactions tend to be common within local areas, whether irrigators along a canal swapping turns or pump owners delivering water to adjoining lands. The parties involved in such transactions often know each other quite well as neighbors or relatives, and their agreements tend to be largely self-enforcing. Because they undertake repeated transactions and want to do so in the future, they are usually keen on maintaining a reputation of trustworthiness. Under such conditions, short-term "spot" markets for water can emerge relatively easily (Saleth, Braden, and Ehart 1991; Easter, Rosegrant, and Dinar 1998) .
For longer-term or permanent water transfers it is harder to create credible commitments. If water rights are not clearly recognized by local communities and government, and accepted as transferable, then it is difficult to be sure that an agreement will be fulfilled. In the event of disputes, courts may be unwilling to enforce agreements, unless a suitable institutional framework exists for transferable water rights.
An often-cited advantage of transferable water rights and water markets is that voluntary transactions should direct water to economically more valuable uses. This can lead to increased efficiency of water use and create incentives for existing users to conserve water, because they can gain by selling or lending the surplus to others. In Chile, for example, secure and tradable water rights sometimes fostered efficient use of water, facilitated a shift to high-value crops that use less water per unit of output, and induced improved efficiency in urban water supply services. Moreover, construction and operation and maintenance (O&M) subsidies to betteroff farmers and urban consumers could be reduced and redirected as targeted subsidies to poor urban water users and small-scale farmers (Gazmuri Schleyer and Rosegrant 1996) . However, in some cases when reservoir operators changed the timing of river flows and reduced water availability to farmers downstream, affected farmers were unable to get courts to restore the access to water they had previously enjoyed. Speculative acquisition of rights reduced water availability for current use, and may have fostered monopolistic practices in hydropower production. Such problems can be severe unless there is an adequate and effective regulatory framework for water markets (Bauer 1997 (Bauer , 1998 (Bauer , 2004 .
In many cases, the two parties engaging in the transaction are not the only ones affected by water use: others are also often affected by changes in the place and time at which water is used. For water markets to work well, such third parties need access to mechanisms that inform them about changes that might affect them, and the opportunity to object to or put conditions on transactions and to receive adequate compensation if they are harmed by the water transfers. The potential for water markets to develop is also constrained by other factors, including the frequency of transactions, the physical infrastructure required to implement and measure a transfer, and political objections to water trading.
Each of the three types of allocation institutions has advantages and disadvantages, as summarized in Table 1 .1. Typically, water allocation occurs through a combination of institutional arrangements including agency roles, user self-governance, and at least some forms of exchange.
Combinations
As water flows through a basin, it may be governed by a whole range of allocation institutions, from private property to common property to agency-controlled state property to open access public property (Meinzen-Dick 2000) . Government control over water abstraction often concentrates on major intakes and relies on local institutions for more detailed distribution and conflict management. From the aspect of reducing transaction costs of time, effort, and other resources required to manage water, such a combination of institutions may be far less costly than reliance on a single type of institution (Guillet 1998) . Thus, the typical situation is not one of a single, homogeneous, and consistent regulatory regime, but rather of water flowing through diverse, overlapping sets of rules.
Claims to water can be based on many sources, including community norms, religious values, historic practices, agency regulations, and laws enacted by different Research on legal pluralism has demonstrated not just the continuing strength of "local" or "customary" law, but also how various legal orders, such as customary law, religious law, and project law, continue to evolve and interact (Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz 1996; Spiertz 2000) . Analysts of legal pluralism point out that rather than a simple duality of state law and local law, there is often a complex interaction that might include local norms and practices, village and district governments, and religious values and leaders, as well as other ideas and principles at the community level. Actions of national and state or provincial governments may be shaped through the procedures of projects, legislation, administrative procedures, and court rulings. Each of these legal orders constitutes a framework for allocating water. Different frameworks may be mutually supporting, or in conflict. Water allocation institutions do not stand alone, and usually depend on other institutions such as courts, legislative bodies, and administrative agencies.
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These overlapping definitions of property rights can be seen as problematic and a source of confusion and conflict. They also create space for maneuver, formation of coalitions, and institutional innovation to solve problems. Disputants can employ multiple strategies, "shopping" among different forums and making various arguments to pursue their claims. The interaction of different kinds of rights, and existence of multiple legitimizing frameworks, is part of the context within which "rights" evolve in response to changing pressures on the resource and on society (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002) .
Neglect of customary rights in the formulation of water law and policies can cause serious opposition from those whose rights are ignored (Burchi 2005) . Discussions of the interaction between state and local property institutions often perceive these as completely separate systems. However, deeper research often reveals that "local" institutions were established or heavily influenced by external factors such as colonial legal regimes and earlier kingdoms. Similarly, water resources that appear to be fully under state control, such as government-managed irrigation systems, may turn out to overlay preexisting local irrigation systems. Local institutions often handle much of water allocation within their boundaries, with conflicts usually resolved through community processes rather than bureaucratic or legal procedures. As water is increasingly contested, however, local institutions come into greater contact with others, bringing different ideas, opportunities, and dangers.
Transformations
Rules and practices regulating access to water are dynamic. Often they provide principles, guidelines, and precedents, but their application to specific cases is open to further debate and interpretation, which may not occur until forced by a particular problem. Changes in water scarcity shift the value of water to different users, reshaping the incentives to obtain more water or defend current access. New opportunities may arise in which water use can be far more productive, but require moving water from some current use. If there is no flexibility in water allocation, obtaining new supplies can be extremely expensive, for example, through building storage or diverting water from other basins.
As water becomes more contested, asymmetries between stakeholders may also become more pronounced. Typically, urban and industrial users have advantages over rural and agricultural users in terms of wealth, power, and knowledge of bureaucratic procedures. Their interests are often more easily organized than those of the large number of dispersed users in rural areas, and therefore may be more effectively defended. Urban and industrial users are usually willing to pay substantially higher prices than the monetary value of water in agricultural use, but they also demand a higher quality of service and reliability. However, existing users, such as irrigators, may have advantages as well, including the legitimacy that comes from longstanding use, political appeal of sustaining farming lifestyles, and the difficulty outsiders face in trying to control a large number of widely scattered users.
Water rights change, evolve, and adapt. There is no single or inevitable pathway for change in water allocation institutions. Agencies have tended to take on increasing roles in water allocation. This may, however, sometimes be due simply to lack of adequate consideration of the existence or possibility of self-governance among users. Markets may play a valuable role in facilitating the voluntary transfer of water to higher value uses, but this still requires a suitable enabling framework of law and infrastructure, as well as regulatory protection against negative third-party effects. If transactions are too scarce then markets may not develop even when enabling conditions are in place.
Changes in water rights institutions are sometimes discussed as if they would be carefully planned and carried out only after a process of thorough deliberation. In practice, droughts and other crises may precipitate urgent actions that deny some rights and strengthen others, with relatively little discussion or assessment of alternatives. Ideas formulated in calmer circumstances may lie in wait and then be taken up when there is political attention and urgency. Protection of instream flows and aquatic habitats often emerges from a process of environmental debate and regulation very different from the irrigation and municipal water supply interests that have tended to predominate in the water sector, bringing new ideas and legal principles into the process of allocating water. Protection of endangered species and wetlands is based on different objectives and criteria than those used to determine volumes of water to be abstracted for use in irrigation or urban water supply. Concern about the environment and public health, reinforced by better technology for detecting pollutants, has brought increased attention to water quality, and the challenges of controlling point and nonpoint sources of pollution. Changes in the prevailing balance of interests in the water sector and in the broader political economy may open new opportunities for change that had earlier been excluded or not even considered.
Improving Water Allocation Institutions
There are many ways to go about enhancing water allocation institutions. Done well, institutional changes may help to make water use more efficient, equitable, and environmentally sound. However, there are also serious risks of disrupting existing institutions, worsening inequities, or creating perverse incentives that compound problems, despite any good intentions that may lie behind reforms. Improving water rights is sometimes seen as simply a matter of issuing formal licenses. Such formal registration may be neither the first nor the best way to go about improving water management. This section outlines some of the institutional options that may form useful components of a framework for improving water allocation.
Forming Forums
Establishing forums or platforms that bring together representatives of water users may be a faster and more effective approach to solving water allocation problems than immediately attempting to strengthen administrative procedures for formalizing water rights. Participatory forums can provide knowledge and legitimacy in revising rules and resolving conflicts over water allocation. Forums may include basin committees, water parliaments with authority to determine budgets and policy, water courts or other bodies with quasi-judicial authority to resolve disputes, advisory committees, and federations of stakeholder organizations, as well as more informal networks of individuals and organizations. Participatory approaches tend to produce results much more easily acceptable to those involved. Engaging stakeholders also helps to better prioritize efforts and identify measures that will be most effective in solving actual problems in specific locations.
The selection of representatives to take part in forums can be a challenge, and needs to be done carefully so as to obtain representatives who will be trusted and accepted as legitimate. Activities can be carried out through transparent, public processes open to any individuals and groups who are sufficiently interested to take part, rather than artificially restricting or excluding participants. It may be important to be proactive about inviting participation of women and people who live in more isolated areas, have lower incomes, are less well educated, ethnically distinct, or for other reasons might not be as likely to take part even if they could be significantly affected by changes in water allocation institutions. In many cases, forums can be made more democratic and inclusive by means of additional outreach to share information. Facilitators can aid particular groups of stakeholders in understanding issues and preparing themselves to take part in a participatory process.
For forums to be effective, public involvement usually needs to go beyond just dissemination of information through meetings and formal public hearings and instead promote interactive discussion and joint problem-solving. A variety of methodologies are available through which committees, citizen panels, and other groups can learn about technical aspects of issues, consider various views and goals, assess policy options and scenarios, and formulate recommendations for how to deal with various problems (IAP2 2000). However, if forums do not have meaningful tasks or lack a genuine opportunity to influence water management, then they may be a waste of time for those involved. Furthermore, not everyone wants to participate. Those who do usually are already busy and face many competing demands for their attention, so forums and other participatory processes need to be efficient in terms of time, information, and other resources. It is important to respect the views of those who may choose not to take part in a particular process, while still finding ways for those who are interested to proceed.
Governments do not have a monopoly on forming forums to address problems in water allocation. User groups, nongovernment organizations, and others outside of government can also take the initiative, as occurred with the Landcare movement for watershed management in Australia and various watershed conservation initiatives in India, New Zealand, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Such forums may be able to solve problems themselves, or offer recommendations for further discussion and consideration in cooperation with others. Groups may be organized based on a particular river basin or sub-basin. In some cases, a coalition or alliance of existing civic and community groups may provide an effective structure for addressing shared concerns along a river or within a watershed.
Recognizing Rights
Improving water rights is sometimes taken to mean that there must be immediate and comprehensive registration in a central cadastre. However, this is far from the only-or even the best-possibility. In most cases, people's actual water rights are embedded not in certificates, but in the rules governing who can use how much water, for what purposes. A gradual approach allowing clarification of rights in response to specific problems and local conditions can offer one way to efficiently provide an enabling framework for improving basin water management. Imposing comprehensive registration is likely to be difficult and costly. It risks delegitimizing and disrupting existing arrangements, without yielding adequate benefits. Even in the case of land rights, which are easier to establish than water rights, cadastres have proven very expensive and problematic, often increasing conflicts, particularly where preexisting systems of multiple, overlapping rights are replaced by individual rights. Moreover, even after the cadastre is established, landowners frequently do not update the records, especially where state structures are less effective than community institutions in effectively backing types of rights over the resource (see Okoth-Ogendo 1986; Toulmin and Quan 2000) . Other approaches, such as strengthening forums for dispute resolution, may do more to protect existing users, and make it easier and less costly to improve water resource management.
In countries such as Indonesia, for example, where farmers have had customary water rights, but have less economic power or access to state agencies than factory owners, hasty or biased formalization of water rights creates a risk that poorer people will lose out (see Sarwan, Subijanto, and Rodgers, this volume). By contrast, in South Africa, where the apartheid system had vested water rights with white farmers with large holdings, the new water law attempts to redress these imbalances by prioritizing water rights for the poor and for the environment (see Seetal and Quibell, this volume).
Many new moves to "establish" water rights act as if there was a blank slate, in which the state holds all water rights and can unilaterally allocate those rights as it wishes. But in almost all cases where water has been in use, existing institutions constitute a system of implicit water rights, based on the ways water is currently being withdrawn, and steps taken or not taken to control withdrawals, particularly during periods of shortage. This is not to say such an existing system is ideal, equitable, or consistent, but it is an important point of reference and the empirical starting point. Current users will usually view their accustomed use as legitimate, and be inclined to challenge anything that they would see as infringing on their rights.
The current system, including its implicit water rights, possesses the institutional inertia that comes from familiarity and acceptance of current practice. It embodies considerable knowledge about how water is currently distributed and the means available for controlling allocations. This knowledge is not limited to written rules and regulations and ideas about how water is controlled, but includes the tacit knowledge embedded in the physical design of intakes and outlets, and in the evolution of practices that have been found to be workable. This implicit system constitutes a valuable resource, built on lessons from experience integrated into local understanding. "Tacit knowledge" is not easily transferable, so there is a comparative advantage for local compared to state control and decisionmaking (see Schlager, this volume) . Appropriately using and building on current allocation institutions can make an invaluable contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of any efforts to improve water allocation institutions.
A crucial first step may be acknowledging existing rights. This does not necessarily require that current rights be registered or formally recorded. Nor does it mean that they must be accepted completely or uncritically, but it is important to ensure that they are not simply ignored, disregarded, or dismissed as illegal. In common law legal systems, recognition of the validity of such existing practices may be a straightforward process. Civil law can also provide ways to recognize customary practices. One example is the way in which the Japanese River Law "deems" that agencies treat existing users as if they have water rights, without requiring any separate process of registration or formalization (Sanbongi 2001) .
Adjusting Characteristics of Water Rights
The bundle of rights authorized by association by-laws, an agency-issued permit, or a contractual agreement can be adjusted. Quantity, timing, duration, exclusiveness, transferability, quality, and other specific characteristics and applicable rules may be changed, or made explicit where they were previously ambiguous or unspecified. If such changes are to constitute improvements, and not just an arbitrary imposition of external models that may be inappropriate, ineffective, and even counterproductive, then it will be important to adapt the definition and characteristics of rights in accordance with the history, priorities, and values of a particular country, basin, and set of water users. For example, many African customary water rights systems give priority to "primary" water uses, which includes domestic use, livestock watering, and certain areas of irrigated gardens (Derman, Hellum, and Sithole 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2005) . As African countries develop more formalized water rights, it is important that these primary water uses-which go beyond the basic domestic use that is normally recognized-continue to receive priority, without necessarily being required to pay fees or go through difficult registration processes.
Changes in water law may have major implications for equity, efficiency, and other goals, particularly in terms of how they affect the entitlements of existing users and potential access of new water users. Technical analysis and legal drafting can support, but should not neglect or replace, consultation among stakeholders and democratic decisionmaking, which can play an essential role in adapting water rights to fit local conditions and needs.
Integrating Multiple Water Rights Frameworks
Where local customs and practice and national constitutions and laws do operate on different principles and procedures, it may be important to consider ways to improve integration, resolving or reducing conflicts while still trying to maintain the advantages of different institutional frameworks. This need not mean forcing local institutions to fit national mandates, but can involve revising laws and regulations and suggesting practical accommodations in how laws are implemented.
Formal recognition of existing rights does pose potential problems. These include the ways in which any process of formalization may, deliberately or inadvertently, transform rights; questions about ratifying existing inequities in who gets water (and differing views about what is and is not equitable); and risks of manipulation and abuse of the recognition process. These are linked to the capacity of current governance institutions. Problems can be reduced by transparent, accessible administration in a way that is open to the participation of all users, including those who may be poor, illiterate, living in remote areas, or otherwise disadvantaged in dealing with bureaucratic procedures, as exemplified by South Africa's efforts (Seetal and Quibell, this volume) .
As with land titling and land reform, there is much scope for debate about the feasibility for promoting more equitable distribution, and how to best pursue equity under such circumstances. A commonly cited example is the Sukhomajri irrigation system in India, in which rights to water under a newly constructed system were assigned to all village members, including landless households, based on labor investment in creating the system (Joshi and Seckler 1982) . Rather than simply assigning rights in accordance with landholding, replicating existing patterns of unequal resource tenure, rights were proactively allocated in a way intended to increase the assets of the poor. At a minimum, this shows the scope for creative alternatives in allocating rights, particularly to newly developed water supplies.
A more subtle issue is that any formalization, even a minimalist recognition, may transform rights, for example, if it individualizes rights that have been held by kin groups or other collective entities. Authority to resolve disputes may shift to local governments for matters that had previously been dealt with through inheritance systems framed by local customs, religious values, or other institutions that may differ from formal law in terms of both concepts and the forums and processes used for dealing with conflicts. To minimize these problems and increase the social legitimacy of water rights administration, Nigeria has customary courts that deal with customary land and water rights issues, drawing upon a range of local experts and oral history as evidence (Burchi 2005) .
Gradual and Selective Licensing
In clarifying government frameworks for water rights, the existing system of implicit rights deserves due attention. Means of acknowledging existing rights, without requiring immediate or comprehensive registration, can be explored (e.g., see Burchi 2005) . In some cases legal requirements for licensing may exist, but may be implemented only for some uses and users. Municipal and industrial users may have to obtain licenses, but not agricultural users. Large-scale uses may require licenses, but not small-scale users. Rather than assuming that comprehensive formal registration is necessary, it may be worthwhile to assess the potential consequences of formalizing rights in the form of licenses or other instruments, considering when and where it may be worth promoting more thorough registration or licensing of water use. This can not only help to economize on scarce budgets and focus government efforts on those problems that deserve highest priority, but can also help avoid activities that disrupt existing water allocation arrangements that may still be functioning relatively effectively.
Inventories
Mapping existing water uses, for example the irrigation systems along a stream, may sometimes be seen primarily as a technical matter. Rather than assuming that inventories can be done only by a government agency, it is worth noting that users themselves may initiate and conduct inventories. For example, an inventory could be compiled by irrigators along a river reach or within a particular sub-basin. Inventories may be important to show the extent of current use, and hence the limits on new rights that can be issued without impairing existing uses. In many countries, inventories of irrigation systems have helped to demonstrate that farmer-managed irrigation systems and other small-scale irrigation cover much larger areas than had previously been shown in official records, important information in terms of understanding how water is currently used (e.g., see Yoder and Upadhyay 1988; Ambler 1994; Tan-Kim-Yong 1995) . However, inventories have major implications in terms of which users and uses are recognized by or "visible" to the government (Scott 1998) . In this regard, water use inventories are similar to mapping of land use: there is considerable risk that even in recording the uses they are likely to lose their flexibility. The inventories can be used as much to impose controls as to defend the prior rights of customary users (see Peluso 1995; Fox 1998) . Irrigation inventories are thus not only a technical procedure, but should be designed with attention to participation, transparency, accountability, accessibility, and other characteristics that may affect not just their accuracy, but how they are perceived and used, and their consequences for the water rights of existing and potential future water users.
Education and Training
Educational activities are important measures for improving water allocation institutions. Information can be communicated through meetings, brochures, newspapers, radio, television, and other media. Educational activities may spread information about current rules and regulations, or promote awareness of problems that need further attention. Farmer-to-farmer exchange and other forms of peer learning may not just help impart skills and knowledge in more easily understood and appropriate ways, but also provide valuable ways to share experience and facilitate networking among water users (Pradhan 1994) .
Planning, Modeling, and Scenarios
Formulating plans can provide a good way to bring together available technical information and use expert analysis to assist in assessing problems and exploring potential solutions. A variety of methods are available for analyzing problems such as those in water resource management, where the same resource is used for multiple purposes by many different stakeholders. Biophysical computer models represent the physical relationships involved, for example, the linkages between rainfall, flows into rivers and aquifers, and usage upstream, with water availability downstream. Integrated hydrological-economic models can combine information on flows with economic information about costs and benefits of water in various uses (Rosegrant et al. 2000) . Scenarios can be used to present management alternatives, such as changes in how water rights are allocated and allowing greater transferability of rights.
There are important questions to be considered about how planning and modeling are done. Who will be involved? Who defines the problems to be considered? What resources are available? What time frame will be analyzed? How will issues such as environmental impacts and water quality be integrated? However, planning can take up much time and expense only to be ignored or rejected, particularly if it is treated as a narrow technical exercise without stakeholder involvement.
Strengthening Agencies
Much thinking concerning agencies for river basin management is still dominated by the Tennessee Valley Authority model of the 1930s. A large government-established bureaucracy carried out construction and management, focused on reservoir construction and operation, operating in a top-down technocratic way. Although that is one option, and many attempts have been made to repeat it in various parts of the world (with limited success), there are many other ways in which specialized agencies may play a role in supporting basin water allocation and water use rights. Agencies may act as specialized technical advisors. They may work as a technical secretariat, supporting a body of stakeholder representatives, as with French water "parliaments." An agency may have a narrow mandate focused on regulatory activities, or may also take on broader resource management roles. Management activities need not include construction, and various agencies may deal with specific issues, rather than having control concentrated in a single agency.
There is a risk of uncritically, and wastefully, copying examples of water management, including the administration of water rights, from wealthy Westernized countries, whereas tropical countries usually have very different management priorities (Shah, Makin, and Sakthivadivel 2001) . Safeguarding and strengthening water management on rainfed lands and microwatersheds in upstream areas may do more to protect livelihoods and prevent poverty than large projects downstream. Bigger may not be better, but instead bring diseconomies of scale that block organizational effectiveness. Unrealistic assumptions about the technical feasibility of new management methods may mean that capabilities of basin organizations fall far short of expectations.
Pathways for Change
As discussed earlier, many means are available for improving water allocation institutions. These can be chosen and applied in accordance with particular circumstances. It is, however, crucial to consider the process that will be used. In many cases, what is needed is not just refining technical analysis or fine-tuning of regulations. Dealing with new problems, or issues where efforts so far have been ineffective, may require not just involving more stakeholders but constituting new institutions, in the form of regulations, organizations, and other institutions, that have the scope, authority, capability, and other characteristics needed to deal with the relevant problems.
Conclusions
For many reasons there is increasing agreement on the need for greater attention to the role of water rights in water resources management. Safeguarding and improving the access of poor people to water is vital for their lives and livelihoods. Clarity and security about water availability is important to poor farmers and others who want to make investments that depend on reliable supplies. Flows of water for aquatic environments need to be ensured because of their importance in sustaining habitats and species, providing recreation, maintaining water quality, and other goals.
Various types of institutional arrangements may be used to regulate socially accepted claims to water, including user self-governance, agency administration, and water markets. In practice, different types of institutions are often combined, and a suitable combination may be more efficient and workable than overemphasis on a single type of allocation. Attempts to improve water allocation institutions can be more effective if they are based on an understanding of existing institutions and the various options available for change. Different river basins have different physical and social conditions, and usually different problems and priorities for improvement. There is no single recipe for improving water rights, but instead a range of options from which to choose.
Methods for improving water rights and water allocation institutions include forming forums, clarifying water rights, planning and modeling techniques, and capacity building for specialized management agencies. These can be used in various sequences and combinations, depending on local problems and priorities, to develop frameworks for water rights that draw optimally on the strengths of various water allocation institutions.
